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ELIMINATING PASSIVE DISPOSAL: EQUALIZING LIABILITY AMONG 
CURRENT AND PRIOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS IN THE 
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Although Congress did not pass the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”)1 until 1980, the seeds were 
sown in 1942 when the Hooker Chemical Company began using a canal branching 
off of the Niagara River as a chemical waste dump.2 In 1953, after dumping about 
21,000 tons of toxic chemicals and backfilling the land, Hooker Chemical sold the 
property to the Niagara School Board, “attempting to absolve itself of any future 
liability by including a warning in the property deed.”3 Over twenty years later, 
after more than a hundred homes and a school were built, when unusually heavy 
rains raised the groundwater levels, “[p]ortions of the Hooker landfill subsided, 55-
gallon drums surfaced, ponds and other surface water [in the] area became 
contaminated, basements began to ooze an oily residue, and noxious chemical 
odors permeated the area.”4 An initial study on ninety-seven families living around 
the site revealed a remarkable increase in the rate of miscarriages among pregnant 
women and birth defects.5 In 1978, President Carter approved emergency funds to 
																																																								*	 © 2017 Joe Amadon. J.D. candidate at the University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. Special thanks to Robin Craig, Bill Richards, Victoria Luman, James 
Owen, David Jaffa, Jon Hart, Steven Swan, McKay Ozuna, Kendra Brown, and Cole 
Crowther. 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2012). 
2 Love Canal—A Brief History, GENESEO, https://www.geneseo.edu/history/love_ 
canal_history [https://perma.cc/K7VW-L898]. 
3 Id. 
4  Fred Stoss & Carole Ann Fabian, Background Information—Love Canal 
Collections, U. BUFF. LIBR. (Aug. 1998), http://library.buffalo.edu/libraries/special 
collections/lovecanal/about/background.php [https://perma.cc/X78S-WNBF]. 
5 On the northern side of the canal, miscarriages per 100 pregnancies rose from 8.5 to 
a rate of 18.6, while the southern side of the canal miscarriages rose from 9.3 to 23.7. 
ROBERT P. WHALEN, N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB, 
at 13 (Aug. 2, 1978), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/love_canal/ 
lctimbmb.htm [https://perma.cc/LU77-Q4AE]. Birth defects per 100 live births rose from 
1.8 to 2.9 on the north side and from 2.2 to 13.3 on the south side. Id. 
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assist with the evacuations of families and cleanup of the site—the first time 
emergency funds were ever issued for something other than a “natural” disaster.6  
Unfortunately, the Love Canal disaster was far from an isolated event. In 
Utah alone there have been twenty-five sites that have been contaminated by 
hazardous substances,7 and “identified by the EPA as . . . candidate[s] for cleanup 
because [they] pose[] a risk to human health and/or the environment.”8 Across the 
country, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has identified 1,782 sites 
where a hazardous substance release has occurred.9 
Largely motivated by the Love Canal disaster and the threat of other such 
environmental hazards across the country,10 Congress enacted CERCLA “with the 
goal of preventing human exposure to toxic substances through remediation of 
contaminated sites.”11 In order to achieve this goal, Congress included a “polluter 
pays” principle,12 with the aim of “assuring that those who caused chemical harm 
bear the costs of that harm.”13 Nevertheless, while Congress was trying to assure 
that those who caused chemical harm bear the costs, CERCLA imposes strict 
liability on four categories of Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRPs”). 14  In 
defining one of these categories of PRPs, CERCLA provides that “any person who 
at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility 
at which such hazardous substances were disposed of” can be held liable for 
response costs incurred to clean up the environmental hazard.15  																																																								
6  Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, 5 EPA J. 17, 18 (1979), 
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy [https://perma.cc/7HK8-SAAG]. 
7 Search for Superfund Sites Where You Live, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/superfund/ 
search-superfund-sites-where-you-live#basic (last updated Aug. 12, 2016) (select Utah 
from the “Select a State” dropdown and click “Go”) [https://perma.cc/S7JE-BF9E].  
8 TOXMAP FAQ, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://toxmap.nlm.nih. 
gov/toxmap/faq/2009/08/what-are-the-superfund-site-npl-statuses.html (last updated Oct. 
2016) [https://perma.cc/8Y4B-RT5S]. 
9 Fifty-three of the sites have been proposed for cleanup, 1,337 have been approved 
and listed on the National Priority List for cleanup, and 392 have gone through the cleanup 
process and been deleted from the National Priority List. NPL Site Totals by Status and 
Milestone, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/superfund/npl-site-totals-status-and-milestone (last 
updated Oct. 3, 2016) [https://perma.cc/E3NJ-7WX9]. 
10 See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 123 (2d ed. 2008).   
11  Emilee Mooney Scott, Note, Bona Fide Protection: Fulfilling CERCLA’s 
Legislative Purpose by Applying Differing Definitions of “Disposal,” 42 CONN. L. REV. 
957, 966 (Feb. 2010). 
12 Id. 
13 United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 
SENATE COMM. OF ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 
1980, S. DOC. NO. 97-14, at 320 (2d Sess. 1983)). 
14 See id. at 259. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2012). 
2017] ELIMINATING PASSIVE DISPOSAL 209 
The problem this classification of PRP presents is that “disposal” has been 
interpreted differently by courts in regard to the natural spreading of contamination 
known as “passive migration,” creating a circuit split. In the Fourth Circuit, 
passive migration of a pollutant constitutes disposal and creates liability.16 In the 
Second and Third Circuits, passive migration isn’t necessarily disposal, 17  but 
neither has it gone as far as the Sixth Circuit which requires active, human conduct 
in order for liability to attach. 18  The Ninth Circuit ignores the passive/active 
distinction and instead uses a more case-by-case analysis to see if the activity fits 
any of the terms used to define disposal.19 Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, 
passive migration from an uncontained deposit of a pollutant would be outside the 
definition of disposal as “leeching” is not a listed term, while the passive escape of 
a pollutant from a barrel would be considered disposal because “leaking” is 
included in the definition of disposal.20 Yet, despite this circuit split, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has refused to address the inconsistent application of 
liability for owners and operators at the time of disposal. 
This Note addresses whether the passive migration of a hazardous substance 
meets CERCLA’s definition of disposal,21 making a prior owner or operator at the 
time of such passive migration liable for response costs as a PRP. Section II 
identifies the purposes of CERCLA and the major, relevant provisions addressing: 
(A) who is a PRP; (B) the liability that PRPs face; and (C) the defenses available 
to PRPs. Section III explains the importance of the definition of disposal in 
determining whether or not an entity is a PRP and explores how courts have 
interpreted disposal in CERCLA cases. Section IV examines how different 
interpretations of disposal in the U.S. Courts of Appeals potentially impact the 
behavior of entities and how these differing incentives comport with the 
congressionally defined purposes of CERCLA. 
 
II.  CONGRESS’S CREATION OF CERCLA 
 
Congress created CERCLA to serve the following two purposes: (1) to protect 
the public by effectuating the cleanup of hazardous waste sites; and (2) to force 
those responsible for the pollution to pay the costs of cleanup.22 CERCLA is a 
remedial statute, which not only creates strict liability but also applies retroactively 																																																								
16 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992). 
17 ABB Indus. Sys. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358–59 (2d Cir. 1997); United 
States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996). 
18 Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc., 264 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 2001). 
19 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2001). 
20 Id. at 879. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2012). 
22 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014); JOHN S. APPLEGATE & 
JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE 128 (2006). 
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to past conduct occurring before enactment of the statute.23 In order to achieve its 
dual purposes, CERCLA: (i) identifies PRPs; (ii) generally holds them jointly and 
severally liable for response costs; and (iii) provides only three limited defenses to 
liability.24 
Under CERCLA, either a governmental or non-governmental party can bring 
a suit to “be reimbursed for response costs incurred by it regardless of its 
liability.”25 In order to “establish[] a prima facie case of liability in a cost-recovery 
lawsuit,” the plaintiff must show: “(1) the site is a ‘facility’ from which (2) a 
‘release’ or ‘threatened release’ into the environment of (3) a ‘hazardous 
substance’ occurred (4) that caused the plaintiff to incur ‘response costs,’ and (5) 
the defendant falls within one or more classes of responsible persons defined by 
CERCLA.”26 PRPs are generally jointly and severally liable to the government for 
costs.27 This structure ensures to the maximum extent possible that at least some 
responsible party will bear the costs of cleanup, and not the government, without 
completely sacrificing the ability of multiple PRPs to work out a more equitable 
split. Specifically, CERCLA incorporates principles of contribution and equitable 
apportionment, allowing for the opportunity for a more equitable split of costs 
among the liable PRPs.28 
 
A.  Who Is a Responsible Party Under CERCLA? 
 
CERCLA identifies four categories of persons who are PRPs liable for 
response costs: 
 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,  
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of,  
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for 
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for 
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration 																																																								
23 APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 22, at 129–30. 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012). 
25  VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND 
LITIGATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAW 138 (1992). 
26 Id. at 138 (citing United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 
1378–79 (8th Cir. 1989); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 
1146, 1152 (1st Cir. 1989); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 786 
(W.D. Mich. 1989)). 
27 See id. at 137–38. 
28  See CHRISTOPHER P. DAVIS, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, 
CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION § 14.01(6)(c)(iv) (last updated by Susan M. Cooke 
May 2009). 
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vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such 
hazardous substances, and  
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for 
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened 
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous 
substance, shall be liable . . . .29 
 
“Once an entity is identified as a PRP, it may be compelled to clean up a 
contaminated area or reimburse the Government for its past and future response 
costs.”30 
 
B.  Liability as a PRP 
 
CERCLA is a strict liability statute, and case law also presumes that PRPs are 
jointly and severally liable for the costs of cleanup regardless of fault or degree of 
contribution to the need for cleanup.31 Such a structure works to achieve one of the 
primary purposes of CERCLA, forcing polluters to pay for the cleanup of their 
pollution.  
However, the strict liability nature of CERCLA can capture owners and 
operators who were not actually responsible for the pollution. For example, let’s 
assume that A owns a parcel of land and buries a barrel of hazardous waste in the 
ground. A sells to B, who knows nothing of the barrel of hazardous waste buried in 
the land, but while B owns the land, the barrel corrodes and the hazardous 
substance leaks out of the barrel into the soil. B cannot be said to be a cause of the 
pollution but nevertheless becomes a PRP under CERCLA because he was the 
owner at the time of disposal of the hazardous substance.  
Fortunately, there are provisions that seek to address this by (1) allowing a 
PRP forced to pay response costs to seek contribution from other PRPs,32 (2) 
providing three narrow defenses that may absolve the liability of a PRP in some 
situations,33 and (3) allowing settlement between a party and the government.34 For 
example, a PRP can seek contribution for response costs under § 9613(f) by 
establishing a prima facie case similar to what is necessary in a fee-recovery 
situation.35 In such an action, the court may, if sufficient evidence is provided, 
proportion costs on an equitable basis so that a PRP who contributed almost none 																																																								
29 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). 
30 Anderson Bros v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 729 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 609 (2009)). 
31 APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 22, at 129–30. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 9622.  
35 AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int’l Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 713, 734–35 (S.D. Ohio 
2001). 
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of the hazardous substances can be awarded reimbursement for most of the 
response costs from the party or parties deemed responsible.36 These provisions 
serve to reduce the likelihood that the government will have to bear the costs of 
cleanup in situations where the original polluter has become insolvent but still 
allow mechanisms that a PRP can utilize to equalize their loss if others share in 
responsibility. 
 
C.  CERCLA’s Express Defenses to PRP Liability 
 
Despite CERCLA’s strict liability nature, the statute expressly provides PRPs 
with three defenses.37 PRPs are not liable when the release and damages “were 
caused solely by—(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a 
third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant . . . .”38  
Once a party is found to be a PRP, only the defenses expressed in the statute 
can absolve liability.39 Equitable defenses are not available to defeat liability under 
CERCLA.40 However,  
 
In addition to the third-party defense under § 9706(b)(3), the defendant 
may assert an ‘innocent landowner’ defense. In order to plead this 
defense, the owners of the property must show, ‘by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the disposal of the hazardous substances occurred 
before they purchased the property, and that at the time of acquisition 
they “did not know and had no reason to know” that the substances had 
been disposed at the facility.’41  
 																																																								
36 See id. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2012). 
38 Id. 
39 Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 
661, 672 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Every court of appeals that has considered the precise question 
whether § 9607 permits equitable defenses has concluded that it does not, as the statutory 
defenses are exclusive.”) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 
F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990) (questioned on other grounds in Key Tronic Corp. v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994)); Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 
283 F.3d 1286, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding CERCLA “explicitly limits defenses to 
those three enumerated in section 9607(b).”); Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 530 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (“By its terms, then, section 107 liability is only barred by a limited number of 
enumerated causation-based affirmative defenses. The clear language of section 107(a) and 
(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(b), manifests the congressional intent to foreclose any non-
enumerated defenses to liability.”); Town of Munster v. Sherwin–Williams Co., 27 F.3d 
1268, 1270 (7th Cir.”). 
40 See cases cited supra note 39.  
41 United States v. Timmons Corp., No. CIV103CV00951RFT, 2006 WL 314457, at 
*11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) (quoting United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 
842 F. Supp. 1543, 1547 (S.D.N.Y.1994)). 
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The Innocent Landowner Defense was created as part of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”). 42  SARA defines 
“contractual relationship” to allow a PRP to escape liability if it can show that it  
 
acquired the land after the disposal of the hazardous substance thereon, 
and either (i) the defendant did not know, or had no reason to know, of 
the hazard when he acquired the land, or (ii) the defendant is a 
government body which legally acquired the property, or (iii) the 
property was inherited.43  
 
Some circuits, such as the Third Circuit in U.S. v. CDMG Realty, have limited 
the use of the Innocent Landowner Defense to PRPs who are current owners and 
operators. Conversely, the Second Circuit allows the defense to be used both by 
current owners or operators and by PRPs found in the second category for owners 
and operators “at the time of disposal” believing this result is clearly written into 
the statute.44 
The defenses provided in § 9607(b) are narrowly applied.45 Once a party has 
been labeled as a PRP, escaping liability becomes difficult. Therefore, much 
CERCLA litigation centers on whether or not an entity is a PRP. 
 
III.  INTERPRETATION OF “DISPOSAL” IN CERCLA CASES 
 
The second category of PRPs attaches liability to owners and operators of a 
facility “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance.” 46  CERCLA’s 
definition of disposal adopts the definition provided in the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act,47 which defines disposal as  
																																																								
42 Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 1, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
43  Rosemary J. Beless, Superfund’s “Innocent Landowner” Defense: Guilty Until 
Proven Innocent, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 247, 253 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(35)(A) (1994)); CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716 n.6. 
44 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 270 F.3d at 883 n.10 (“It is an open question whether the 
innocent owner defense is available to only current owners, or both current and past 
owners.”). Compare CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716 (explaining that the Innocent 
Landowner Defense is limited in use to current owners) with Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. 
Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The second sentence of § 
101(35)(C) makes it clear that Congress intended the innocent landowner exception to 
allow innocent purchasers of property—i.e. purchasers who are unaware, despite 
appropriate inquiry, that hazardous substances have been placed or disposed of on the 
property—subsequently to sell the property without losing their exemption from liability 
caused solely by a third party ‘in connection with’ such a sale.”). 
45 FOGLEMAN, supra note 25, at 226. 
46 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2012). 
47 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2012).  
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the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of 
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that 
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter 
the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, 
including ground waters.48  
 
While the initial disposal may be somewhat straightforward, federal courts 
are split on whether the passive migration of a hazardous substance that occurs 
after the initial disposal continues to constitute disposal that creates liability for 
subsequent owners.49 These courts have identified two distinct circumstances that 
can differentiate whether or not passive migration can constitute disposal under 
CERCLA: (1) the continued leakage of a hazardous substance from a container 
that the owner or operator does not know exists; and (2) the spread of an 
uncontained hazardous substance through the soil. Both situations involve the 
same level of culpability on the party of the owner or operator but can lead to 
different determinations of liability in most circuits.50 
 
A.  Fourth Circuit Holds Passive Migration Can Create CERCLA Liability 
 
The Fourth Circuit was one of the first federal circuits to squarely address the 
issue of passive migration as disposal and did so in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. 
Hooper & Sons Co.51 In Nurad, the trial court found that a prior owner or operator 
of the facility where underground storage tanks leaked a hazardous substance into 
the environment could not be liable under CERCLA “even though passive 
migration of hazardous substances may have occurred during his ownership—
since he did not take an active role in managing the tanks or their contents.”52 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the district court’s “construction 
																																																								
48 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2014).  
49 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 270 F.3d at 875 (“Other circuit courts have taken a 
variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic 
circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of 
views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case.”). Compare 150 
Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706 (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human 
activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the 
property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc., 120 F.3d at 359 (holding that prior 
owners are not liable for the gradual spread of contamination underground), and CDMG 
Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 722 (holding that “the passive spreading of contamination in a 
landfill does not constitute ‘disposal’ under CERCLA”), with Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 846 
(holding past owners liable for the “disposal” of hazardous wastes that leaked from an 
underground storage tank). 
50 FOGLEMAN, supra note 25, at 193. 
51 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). 
52 Id. at 844. 
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of ‘disposal’ ignores the language of the statute, contradicts clear circuit precedent, 
and frustrates the fundamental purposes of CERCLA.”53  
The Fourth Circuit examined the language of the statutory definition of 
disposal by conceding that some of the terms used require “active human 
participation,” others, such as “leak” or “spill” could be passive without any such 
active human participation.54 It referred to its prior ruling in United States v. Waste 
Ind., Inc.,55 which established that the definition of disposal under 42 U.S.C. § 
6903 includes “not only active conduct, but also the reposing of hazardous waste 
and its subsequent movement through the environment.” 56  The court also 
supported its inclusion of passive conduct in the definition of disposal by claiming 
that “the district court’s requirement of active participation would frustrate the 
statutory policy of encouraging ‘voluntary private action to remedy environmental 
hazards.’”57 It explained that under an interpretation of disposal that doesn’t hold 
passive owners and operators liable, a perverse incentive would be created in 
which “an owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an 
environmental hazard festers on his property . . . [S]o long as he transfers the 
property before any response costs are incurred.” 58  In contrast, “[a] more 
conscientious owner who undertakes the task of cleaning up the environmental 
hazard would, on the other hand, be liable as the current owner of the facility, since 
‘disposal’ is not a part of the current owner liability scheme under 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)(1).”59 The Fourth Circuit pointed out that such an application would not 
only create such a perverse incentive but also impose liability on a current owner 
who is just as passive and innocent as a prior owner who escapes liability, which 
seems to be incongruent with the strict liability that CERCLA enforces.60 For these 
reasons, the Fourth Circuit held that “§ 9607(a)(2) imposes liability not only for 
active involvement in the ‘dumping’ or ‘placing’ of hazardous waste at the facility, 
but for ownership of the facility at a time that hazardous waste was ‘spilling’ or 
‘leaking.’”61 
 
B.  Third Circuit Finds Passive Migration Isn’t Necessarily “Disposal” 
 
The next major decision regarding passive migration’s implications under 
CERCLA came two years later in United States v. CDMG Realty Co.,62 where the 
Third Circuit held that passive migration of contaminants dumped in the land does 																																																								
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 845. 
55 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
56 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845 (citing Waste Inc., 734 F.2d at 164). 
57 Id. (quoting In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1991)).  
58 Id. 
59 Id. (citing New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
60 Id. at 845–46. 
61 Id. at 846. 
62 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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not necessarily constitute disposal that would make a prior owner or operator liable 
for response costs.63 In CDMG, the prior owner, Dowel, purchased a landfill that 
contained hazardous substances, but no waste was deposited during Dowel’s 
ownership of the property. 64  Dowel’s only activity at the site was “soil 
investigation . . . to determine the land’s ability to support construction.” 65  In 
finding that Dowel was not a PRP as an owner “at the time of disposal,” the court 
examined: (1) the language of the definition of disposal itself;66 (2) a comparison 
of the definitions and usage of disposal and “release” in CERCLA; 67  (3) the 
context in which disposal is used in the second category of PRPs;68 (4) how the 
Innocent Land Owner defense contained within CERCLA suggests meaning;69 and 
(5) how different interpretations serve the purposes of CERCLA.70 
First, CDMG examined the plain meaning of the terms used to define disposal 
by focusing on the two words that could be considered passive, “leaking” and 
“spilling.”71 However, the court pointed out that while “leaking” and “spilling” 
have definitions that do not require “affirmative human action,” other definitions 
of “leaking” and “spilling” do require “affirmative human action.”72 It continued 
its examination of “leaking” and “spilling” by examining the context in which 
those words are used, because “one may infer meaning by examining the 
surrounding words.” 73  Without providing a definitive determination as to the 
meaning of these terms, the Third Circuit pointed out that “[t]he words 
surrounding ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’—‘discharge,’ ‘deposit,’ ‘injection,’ 
‘dumping,’ and ‘placing’—all envision a human actor.”74 
Therefore, “Congress may have intended active meanings of ‘leaking’ and 
‘spilling.’” 75  Nevertheless, the court stated that it did not need to come to a 
determination on whether or not “leaking” and “spilling” as used in the definition 
of disposal requires active human conduct, because “neither word denotes the 
gradual spreading of contamination alleged here,” explaining that the spread of 
contamination simply cannot be said to be either “leaking” or “spilling” regardless 
of whether either term includes passive conduct.76 
																																																								
63 Id. at 710–11. 
64 Id. at 711. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 714. 
67 Id. at 714–15. 
68 Id. at 715–16. 
69 Id. at 716–17. 
70 Id. at 717–18. 
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Second, the Third Circuit compared the definition of disposal with the 
definition of “release” used in CERCLA, pointing to two factors influencing the 
court’s interpretation of disposal.77 Congress included “disposing” in the definition 
of “release,” which indicates that “release” is broader in meaning than disposal.78 
Congress also used the term “leaching” in its definition of “release,” which 
demonstrates that Congress knew how to refer to the “spreading of waste” and 
chose to not include such activity in the definition of disposal.79 
Third, the Third Circuit further supported its position that the passive 
migration in this case was not intended to be included in the definition of disposal 
by examining the language of CERCLA’s liability provision, § 9607(a).80 One of 
the categories of PRPs is “any person who at the time of disposal . . . owned or 
operated any facility.”81 Interpreting disposal to include the passive spread of a 
pollutant “would be a rather complicated way of making liable all people who 
owned or operated a facility after the introduction of waste into the facility,” and 
there would be no need for § 9607(a)(1), which assigns liability to the current 
owner or operator.82 
Fourth, CDMG stated that considering passive migration to constitute 
disposal would also invalidate the Innocent Landowner Defense, which provides a 
defense when the defendant shows, in addition to other elements, that he or she 
acquired the real property “after the disposal.”83 If the spread of the contaminant 
constitutes disposal, there will almost never be a time “after the disposal” to which 
the defense could apply, because disposal would be ongoing until the cleanup of 
the hazardous substance had been undertaken.84 
Fifth, the Third Circuit explained that its interpretation of disposal as not 
including passive migration in this case “is consistent with CERCLA’s purposes” 
of “facilitat[ing] the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites and to 
force polluters to pay the costs associated with their pollution.”85 Specifically, 
despite an owner’s ability to evade liability for transferring the land that was 
previously contaminated, the Innocent Landowner Defense could provide similar 
protection, and there are other disincentives to an owner who knowingly transfers 
contaminated land.86 Moreover, even if such an owner can escape liability, there 																																																								
77 Id. at 714–15. 
78 Id. at 715. 
79 Id. at 714. 
80 Id. at 715–16. 
81 Id. at 715 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2012)). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 716 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2012)). 
84 Id. at 716. 
85 Id. at 717 (citations omitted). 
86 Id. at 717–18 (stating that a prior owner can become liable under CERCLA simply 
for knowing of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance and not 
disclosing such knowledge to a person to whom she is transferring the property) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (2012)). 
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are other parties, such as the actual polluter, who can still be found liable for the 
response costs.87 
For those reasons, the Third Circuit held that the spread of contamination 
dumped in the land prior to a person’s ownership or operation does not of itself 
constitute a disposal that makes that person liable under CERCLA.88 
 
C.  The Second Circuit Adopts the Analysis of CDMG to Hold that Passive 
Migration Does Not Constitute “Disposal” Under CERCLA 
 
In 1997, in ABB Industrial Systems v. Prime Technology, Inc.,89 the Second 
Circuit followed the CDMG ruling and held “prior owners and operators of a site 
are not liable under CERCLA for mere passive migration.” 90  In ABB, ABB 
Industrial Systems, Inc. was the current owner when it discovered that the property 
was contaminated with several hazardous substances requiring cleanup.91 It sued 
Pacific Scientific Co. (“Pacific”), General Resistance, Inc., and Zero-Max, Inc. as 
PRPs.92 There was strong evidence that Pacific had contaminated the property, but 
no evidence that either General Resistance or Zero-Max had caused any new 
contamination.93 However, ABB claimed that General Resistance and Zero-Max 
were liable under § 9607(a)(2) as prior owners or operators at the time of disposal, 
arguing that “the chemicals gradually spread[ing] underground (passive 
migration)” constituted disposal.94 
In rejecting ABB’s argument that passive migration constitutes disposal under 
CERCLA, the Second Circuit stated that it was “persuaded by the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning” from CDMG. 95  Instead of “reinventing the wheel” used to analyze 
disposal under CERCLA, the court “simply summarize[d] . . . what [it] believe[d] 
to be the Third Circuit’s most persuasive arguments.”96 First, none of the terms 
used to define disposal are “commonly used to refer to the gradual spreading of 
hazardous chemicals already in the ground.”97 Second, the court pointed to the 
differences between the use of “release” and disposal, relying on a presumption 
that Congress intended there to be the differences there are in its word choices and 
that Congress chose to include “leaching” in defining “release” but exclude it from 
the definition of disposal.98 Third, the Second Circuit pointed to the Third Circuit’s 																																																								
87 Id. at 718. 
88 Id. at 710, 718. 
89 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997). 
90 Id. at 359. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 354. 
93 Id. at 354–55. 
94 Id. at 356. 
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understanding of the Innocent Landowner Defense as supporting the exclusion of 
passive migration from disposal. 99  However, it ultimately did not adopt this 
argument because the Second Circuit allows prior owners to use the Innocent 
Landowner Defense, while the Third Circuit and other circuits allow only the 
current owner to use the defense, which changes the argument significantly.100 
Fourth, “[o]ne of CERCLA’s goals is ‘to force polluters to pay the cost associated 
with their pollution.’”101 
Therefore, a person who “is not a polluter and is not one upon whom 
CERCLA aims to impose liability” should not be held liable as a PRP.102 “For 
these reasons, [the Second Circuit held] that prior owners and operators of a site 
are not liable under CERCLA for mere passive migration.”103 
 
D.  Sixth Circuit Holds that Active Human Conduct Is a Requirement of 
“Disposal” 
 
The Sixth Circuit was next to address the issue of what is required of disposal 
under CERCLA in the cases of United States v. 150 Acres of Land104 and Bob’s 
Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc.105 In 150 Acres, the court looked at the definition of 
disposal as it plays into the Innocent Landowner Defense in a context where the 
current owners of a large property containing several drums filled with hazardous 
substances did not engage in any active conduct with the hazardous substances or 
even know of its presence on the property.106  
The Sixth Circuit examined the definition of disposal in this situation because 
the Innocent Landowner Defense allows a person to escape liability when that 
person acquired the land “after the ‘disposal’ or ‘placement’ of the substances” and 
either “acquired their interests by inheritance or bequest” or, after an appropriate 
inquiry, had no reason to know of the substances.107 In defining disposal to not 
include passive migration, the court referred to CDMG and ABB and supported its 
decision by stating: (1) “‘disposal’ is defined primarily in terms of active words”; 
(2) “‘release’ must be broader than ‘disposal,’ because disposal is included within 
release”; and (3) in considering the statutory scheme, it makes sense that 
“‘disposal’ stand for activity that precedes the entry of a substance into the 




101 Id. (quoting CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 717). 
102 Id. at 358–59. 
103 Id. at 359. 
104 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000). 
105 264 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2001). 
106 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 702–06. 
107 Id. at 704 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (2002)). 
108 Id. at 706. 
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One year later, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this definition of disposal in Bob’s 
Beverage, holding that “[d]isposal requires evidence of ‘active human conduct,’ 
and addresses ‘activity that precedes the entry of a substance into the 
environment.’”109  The holdings from 150 Acres and Bob’s Beverage place the 
Sixth Circuit at the end of the disposal definition spectrum with the narrowest 
definition of disposal. 
 
E.  Ninth Circuit Holds Rejects Passive Versus Active Distinction in Interpreting 
“Disposal” Under CERCLA 
 
In Carson Harbor Village v Unocal Corp.,110 the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
issue of whether the spread of contaminants in the land constitutes disposal, 
holding that such migration through the soil does not constitute disposal under 
CERCLA111 but suggesting that other forms of passive migration may constitute 
disposal. 112  Notably, the Ninth Circuit also eschewed the “active/passive” 
distinction that the other circuits had found key. 
The Ninth Circuit began its interpretation of disposal by first looking to the 
plain meaning of the language and “conclude[d] that ‘release’ is broader than 
‘disposal,’ because the definition of ‘release’ includes ‘disposing.’”113 The court 
also considered but “reject[ed] the absolute binary ‘active/passive’ distinction used 
by some courts,” because the terms used in both definitions included both passive 
and active terms.114 Instead, the Ninth Circuit examined each of the terms used to 
define disposal in relation to the facts of the case to determine if disposal occurred 
during the “gradual passive migration of contamination through the soil.”115  It 
noted that the passive soil migration could be said to be “spreading,” “migration,” 
“seeping,” “oozing,” and “possibly ‘leaching’” but none of these can fit within the 
plain and common meaning of the terms defining disposal.116 
However, while the Ninth Circuit concluded that the spread of contaminants 
through the soil did not constitute disposal, it also rejected the “active/passive” 
distinction. As a result, it did not create a definition of disposal that requires active 
human conduct as the Sixth Circuit used in 150 Acres and Bob’s Beverage. In fact, 
the court in Carson Harbor stated that “[t]he circumstances here are not like that of 
the leaking barrel or underground storage tank . . . or a vessel or some other 
container that would connote ‘leaking,’” and therefore constitute disposal under 
CERCLA.117 																																																								
109 264 F.3d at 697 (quoting 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706). 
110 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001). 
111 Id. at 867. 
112 Id. at 880. 
113 Id. at 878. 
114 Id. at 878–79. 
115 Id. at 879. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 879–80. 
2017] ELIMINATING PASSIVE DISPOSAL 221 
Carson Harbor then looked to the statute as a whole in order to “assess 
whether [its] interpretation of ‘disposal’ is in accord with the statute’s purpose, and 
creates or minimizes any internal inconsistency in CERCLA.”118 First, the court 
identified that the primary purpose of CERCLA is “to protect and preserve public 
health and the environment by facilitating the expeditious and efficient cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites” and the secondary purpose is “assuring that ‘responsible’ 
persons pay for the cleanup.”119 The court concluded that its interpretation, which 
holds a passive owner liable for leaking containers but not soil migration, serves 
these dual purposes by encouraging landowners to inspect their property for such 
containers and prevent contamination or clean it up to prevent an increase in 
costs.120 Next, the court concluded that its interpretation of disposal fits the liability 
provisions of CERCLA best because “the extreme positions on either side [of the 
active/passive debate] render the structure awkward.”121 “[H]ad Congress intended 
all passive migration to constitute a ‘disposal,’ then disposal is nearly always a 
perpetual process,” and there would be no need for separate categories for current 
owners and operators and another category for prior owners and operators, because 
both would be equally owners and operators at the time of disposal.122 “On the 
other extreme, had Congress intended ‘disposal’ to include only releases directly 
caused by affirmative human conduct, then it would make no sense to establish a 
strict liability scheme assigning responsibility to ‘any person who at the time of 
disposal . . . owned or operated any facility.’”123 
In continuing to examine the statute for internal inconsistencies based on the 
interpretation of disposal, the Ninth Circuit also recognized that “an interpretation 
of ‘disposal’ that encompasse[s] all subsoil passive migration” essentially 
eliminates the “innocent landowner defense.”124 It supported this conclusion by 
noting that considering all passive migration disposal would lead to almost no one 
being able to use the defense because the disposal would be never ending and thus 
no owner could acquire the property after the disposal, as the defense requires.125 
Moreover, under an interpretation that finds that no passive migration can 
constitute disposal, the defense is useless because “there would exist no landowner 
capable of presenting an innocent landowner defense who would not already be 
excluded from liability in the first place.”126 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit 
held that “passive migration of contaminants through soil . . . [is] not a ‘disposal’ 
under § 9607(a)(2).”127 																																																								
118 Id. at 880. 
119 Id. (citations omitted). 
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126 Id. at 883 (citation omitted). 
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IV.  EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
“DISPOSAL” 
 
“As numerous courts have observed, CERCLA is a remedial statute which 
should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals.”128 However, does a liberal 
definition of disposal, resulting in liability for entities that did nothing more than 
own or operate the property during the passive migration of a hazardous substance 
that they were unaware of, actually effectuate the goals of CERCLA: (1) to protect 
the public by effectuating the cleanup of hazardous waste sites; and (2) to force 
those responsible for the pollution to pay the costs of cleanup?129  
 
A.  Punishing Passive Migration to Achieve the Purposes of CERCLA 
 
In Nurad, the Fourth Circuit supported its holding that “§ 9607(a)(2) imposes 
liability not only for active involvement in the ‘dumping’ or ‘placing’ of hazardous 
waste at the facility, but for ownership of the facility at a time that hazardous waste 
was ‘spilling’ or ‘leaking,’”130 by stating that a “requirement of active participation 
would frustrate the statutory policy of encouraging ‘voluntary private action to 
remedy environmental hazards.’”131 It explained that, under an interpretation of 
disposal that requires active conduct, “an owner could avoid liability by simply 
standing idle while an environmental hazard festers on his property . . . so long as 
he transfers the property before any response costs are incurred.”132 In contrast, a 
current owner who likewise does nothing about an environmental hazard but is 
unable to transfer the property before response costs are incurred, will be found 
liable as a current owner or operator because § 9607(a)(1) does not require 
disposal.133 The court concluded that such a scheme “which rewards indifference 
to environmental hazards and discourages voluntary efforts at waste cleanup 
cannot be what Congress had in mind” when it enacted CERCLA.134 
However, there are two problems with the Fourth Circuit’s argument. First, it 
ignores the existence of the Innocent Landowner Defense. Second, while its 
solution does remove some of the “rewards [for] indifference,” it still does nothing 
to encourage voluntary cleanups. 																																																								
128 United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992); Dedham Water Co. v. 
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
129 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014); APPLEGATE & LAITOS, 
supra note 22, at 128–29. 
130 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 846. 
131 Id. at 845. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 845–46. 
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The Fourth Circuit conducted its analysis describing the supposed outcomes 
of a particular definition of disposal without incorporating the Innocent Landowner 
Defense included in the 1986 SARA amendments.135 Its argument included the 
premise that a current landowner cannot escape liability if he or she owns or 
operates the property when response costs are incurred.136 However, the Innocent 
Landowner Defense provides protection to a defendant who can “show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the disposal of the hazardous substances 
occurred before they purchased the property, and that at the time of acquisition 
they did not know and had no reason to know that the substances had been 
disposed at the facility.”137 Thus, in the scenario the Fourth Circuit presented, the 
current owner could escape liability so long as he or she did not know or have 
reason to know of the contamination at the time he or she acquired the property.  
However, because some circuits allow only current owners and operators to 
use the Innocent Landowner Defense, working through the Fourth Circuit’s 
argument while considering the Innocent Landowner Defense is difficult. 138  In 
circuits that limit the Innocent Landowner Defense to current owners and 
operators, the Fourth Circuit’s argument fails, because prior owners and operators 
who are just as innocent as the current owner would be liable, while the current 
owner would be excused from liability.  
As a result, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of disposal does not seem to 
serve the purposes of CERCLA. In circuits that allow both current and prior 
landowners to use the Innocent Landowner Defense, the Fourth Circuit’s argument 
holds up better because current owners are still encouraged to address 
environmental hazards they identify and because they can escape liability without 
transferring the property before response costs are incurred. Additionally, prior 
owners and operators can escape liability, though the burden is on the defendant to 
establish the elements of the defense. However, this burden shifting serves the 
purposes of CERCLA by requiring inspection in order to assert the defense and not 
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant did not inspect the property. 
 
B.  Excusing Passive Migrations to Achieve the Purposes of CERCLA 
 
The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have all to some extent excused passive 
conduct from being considered disposal. 139  The Third Circuit concluded its 
interpretation of disposal “is clearly consistent with the latter purpose” of 
CERCLA, of “forc[ing] polluters to pay the costs associated with their 																																																								
135 See id. 
136 Id. at 845. 
137 United States v. Timmons Corp., No. CIV103CV00951RFT, 2006 WL 314457, at 
*11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) (citations omitted).  
138 Bob’s Beverage, Inc., 264 F.3d at 697; ABB Indus. Sys., Inc., 120 F.3d at 358–59; 
CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 711. 
139 Bob’s Beverage, Inc., 264 F.3d at 697–98; 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706; 
ABB Indus. Sys., 120 F.3d at 359; CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 711. 
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pollution.”140 This argument is strongly supported by its premise that “[t]hose who 
owned previously contaminated property where waste spread without their aid 
cannot reasonably be characterized as ‘polluters.’”141 Therefore, “excluding them 
from liability will not let those who cause the pollution off the hook.”142 The Third 
Circuit concluded, therefore, that its holding “will not undermine the goal of 
facilitating the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites.”143  
Such a statement undersells the impact of the court’s holding, however, 
because its application of CERCLA discourages the cleanup of potentially 
dangerous hazardous waste sites.144 “The only prior owners who will not pay any 
cleanup costs are those who bought and sold the land with no knowledge that the 
land is contaminated.” 145  “In addition, the innocent owner defense encourages 
potential buyers to investigate the possibility of contamination before a 
purchase.” 146  Therefore, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of disposal in 
conjunction with the Innocent Landowner Defense promotes investigation of 
potential environmental hazards prior to purchase in order to avoid liability and 
promotes the reporting of any discovered environmental hazards after taking 
ownership, because liability can be avoided only by either: (1) reporting the hazard 
while still owning the property and asserting the Innocent Landowner Defense; or 
(2) by disclosing the release or threatened release to the person to whom ownership 
is being transferred, which will almost certainly affect any purchase price because 
the transferee will be accepting liability for the response costs with no applicable 
defense under CERCLA. 
 
C.  Ignoring the Passive Versus Active Interpretations of “Disposal” 
 
The Ninth Circuit in Carson Harbor did not accept the argument that 
interpreting the definition of disposal to determine if passive migration qualified as 
disposal required an analysis of the active versus passive nature of the terms used 
to define disposal.147 Instead, the Ninth Circuit took a more natural approach to 
apply the statute by looking at the meaning of each of the words used to define 
disposal and evaluating whether or not the factual scenario presented in the case 
could be described by those terms.148 The court ruled that the factual scenario—
contaminants spreading through the soil—could be described as “‘spreading,’ 
‘migration,’ ‘seeping,’ ‘oozing,’ and possibly ‘leaching,’” but none of these can fit 																																																								
140 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 717. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 718. 
144 See id. 
145 Id. at 717–18. 
146 Id. at 718. 
147 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 270 F.3d at 878–79. 
148 Id. 
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within the terms defining disposal, 149  “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, 
spilling, leaking, or placing.”150 The court emphasized that “[n]othing spilled out 
of or over anything” and “[t]he circumstances here are not like that of the leaking 
barrel or underground storage tank envisioned by Congress . . . that would connote 
‘leaking.’”151 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s holding means that whether or not a 
prior owner who does nothing to spread the contamination, or even know of the 
existence of contamination, he or she can be liable as a PRP under § 9607 (a)(2) if 
the actual, responsible polluter put the hazardous substance into some sort of 
container from which the hazardous substance continues to leak or spill.152 
The Ninth Circuit claimed that its “conclusion that ‘disposal’ does not include 
passive soil migration but that it may include other passive migration that fits 
within the plain meaning of the terms used to define ‘disposal’ is consistent with 
CERCLA’s dual purposes.” 153  It supported its argument by stating that “if 
‘disposal’ is interpreted to exclude all passive migration, there would be little 
incentive for a landowner to examine his property for decaying disposal tanks, 
prevent them from spilling or leaking, or to clean up contamination once it was 
found.”154 This argument fails on each assertion. 
First, there is no need to incentivize repeated inspection of land for hazardous 
substances by imposing liability for passive leaking and spilling. CERCLA 
incentivizes the inspection of the property before taking ownership of the property 
in order to effectively assert the Innocent Landowner Defense.155 Further, the third-
party defense requires that “the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that . . . he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any 
such third party . . . .”156 Thus, a landowner is incentivized by CERCLA to inspect 
the property before taking ownership and then to take reasonable action to prevent 
third parties from contaminating the property. Therefore, because there is little 
likelihood that anything will be discovered by subsequent inspections of the land 
that wasn’t discovered by the initial inspection of the land, there is no need to 
incentivize such inspections during ownership. 
Second, there is a clear incentive to prevent decaying disposal tanks from 
spilling or leaking. Even if an owner ignores its potential tort liability stemming 
from the knowledge of hazardous substances in containers that are decaying, 
CERCLA provides an incentive to prevent such spills and leaks. If response costs 
are incurred while in ownership, that owner would be liable. 157  Additionally, 																																																								
149 Id. at 879. 
150 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2012). 
151 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 270 F.3d at 879. 
152 See id. at 879–80. 
153 Id. at 881. 
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155 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 703. 
156 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2012). 
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preventing or reporting the release or threatened release would significantly reduce 
the response costs of the cleanup needed were a release to actually occur.  
Furthermore, the scenario where an owner did not know about a hazardous 
substance that continued to leak from a container that she did not know existed on 
her land is a very different situation from that of an owner who knows of decaying 
containers of hazardous waste on her property and does nothing. While both can be 
said to be passive in common terms, the latter owner who makes a clear choice to 
do nothing in the face of a significant risk is more culpable. Such an act of 
omission is not “passive” in the legal sense,158 and, therefore the owner will have a 
difficult argument that she was not liable under § 9607(a)(2).  
Further, as discussed above, liability attaches to an owner who knows of a 
hazardous substance’s release or threatened release and transfers the property 
without disclosing such knowledge. Similarly, this line of logic shows how 
cleaning up found contamination is already incentivized because the earlier the 
cleanup is initiated the lower the response costs will be, and there is an increased 
likelihood of escaping liability through the Innocent Landowner Defense. 
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that “[n]o statutory provision is written in a 
vacuum . . . . [and] [t]hus, we examine the statute as a whole, including its purpose 
and various provisions.”159 So, while the Ninth Circuit’s process of determining the 
plain language meaning of disposal—looking at the common meaning of the terms 
used in the definition and comparing them to the factual conduct before them—
may have been a more logical approach than that of other circuits that looked at the 
passive/active dichotomy, the Ninth Circuit’s holding leads to an illogical result.  
Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a defendant’s liability is dependent on 
whether or not a third party, which the defendant has no knowledge of, placed the 
hazardous substance in a container or not before contaminating the land—that is, 
on whether the waste can actually spill or leak from a container or on whether it 
can only migrate through the soil.160 The Ninth Circuit defended its holding by 
arguing that “had Congress intended ‘disposal’ to include only releases directly 
caused by affirmative human conduct, then it would make no sense to establish a 
strict liability scheme . . . . Rather, the statute would have a straightforward 
causation requirement.”161 However, while courts have interpreted CERCLA to be 
a strict liability statute, “the text of CERCLA is ambiguous about the liability it 
imposes.”162 Further, if Congress did intend to create a strict liability statute, as 
courts have determined, there are other reasons to structure the statute as they did, 
such as shifting the burden to the defendant in order to ease prosecution. 
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The Ninth Circuit pointed to the Innocent Landowner Defense to support its 
interpretation of disposal on the basis that excluding all passive migration from 
disposal “would eliminate the need for an innocent landowner defense 
altogether.” 163  However, this argument ignores the fact that the Innocent 
Landowner Defense would still be used by current owners and operators found 
liable under § 9607(a)(1) because disposal is not a requirement under that category 
of PRP.164 Notably, a representative defending the 1986 amendments argued “that 
wholly innocent landowners will not be held liable” and it seems likely the 
amendment was trying to equalize the excuse of liability among “innocent” current 
owners with that of “innocent” prior owners.165 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
It seems clear, through the 1986 SARA, that Congress did not want innocent 
parties who conducted due diligence in inspecting the land to be liable under 
CERCLA. Thus, expanding CERCLA’s definition of disposal to attach liability to 
passive conduct is inconsistent with Congress’s intent. Therefore, in order to align 
enforcement of CERCLA with its dual purposes and Congress’s intent in enacting 
the Act, disposal should be interpreted to exclude passive migration of hazardous 
substances when the owner or operator knows nothing of the presence of the 
hazardous substance that is spreading. 
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